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ABSTRACT
In their recent article, Brown et al 
analyse several ethical aspects around 
immunity passports and put forward some 
recommendations for implementing them. 
Although they offer a comprehensive 
perspective, they overlook two essential 
aspects. First, while the authors consider the 
possibility that immunological passports may 
appear to discriminate against those who do 
not possess them, the opposite viewpoint of 
immune people is underdeveloped. We argue 
that if a person has been tested positive for 
and recovered from COVID-19, becoming 
immune to it, she cannot be considered a 
hazard to public health and, therefore, the 
curtailment of her fundamental rights (eg, 
the right to freedom of movement) is not 
legitimate. Second, they omit that vaccine 
distribution will create similar problems related 
to immunity- based licenses. Vaccine certificates 
will de facto generate a sort of immunity 
passport. In the next phases of the pandemic, 
different immunity statuses will be at stake, 
because the need to identify who can spread 
COVID-19 is unavoidable. If a person does not 
pose a threat to public health because she 
cannot spread the infection, then her right to 
freedom of movement should be respected, 
regardless of how she acquired that immunity.
The literature on the ethical ques-
tions raised by so- called immunity pass-
ports has grown steadily in the last 
months.1–6 The recent article by Brown 
et al offers an interesting standpoint 
on the topic by analysing some of the 
practical considerations and prominent 
ethical aspects involved.7 However, in 
our view, it neglects two essential issues 
of the debate. First, the perspective of 
defending the fundamental rights of those 
who are immune to COVID-19 needs 
to be explored much more thoroughly. 
Second, immunity passports will de facto 
exist as soon as vaccines become available. 
These critical omissions have been simi-
larly ignored by most commentators. The 
discussion should, however, focus on what 
kind of immunity statuses are legitimate in 
order to grant immunity- based licences 
and, equally importantly, what rights and 
liberties these statuses will entitle.
With regard to the first issue, it is neces-
sary to refer to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 
November 1950. This is a fundamental 
legal tool that defends individual rights 
and freedoms in all signatory countries, 
including most European countries. 
According to article 5, ‘Everyone has the 
right to liberty and security of person. No 
one shall be deprived of his liberty save 
in the following cases and in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law: (…) 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the 
prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, 
alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants’.8
The Convention establishes a right 
to freedom of movement that cannot be 
restricted but ‘for the prevention of the 
spreading of infectious diseases’. It is 
necessary to emphasise that the Conven-
tion does not even allow in principle to 
limit the freedom of movement to avoid a 
risk of collapse for the health system—one 
of the reasons given to justify the lock-
downs, as Brown et al pointed out. The 
question according to the Convention is 
simply whether a citizen poses a threat to 
public health. Moreover, the European 
Court of Human Rights determined in the 
case of Enhorn v. Sweden (application no. 
56529/00 of 25 January 2005) that
the essential criteria when assessing the 
‘lawfulness’ of the detention of a person 
‘for the prevention of the spreading 
of infectious diseases’ are whether the 
spreading of the infectious disease is 
dangerous to public health or safety, and 
whether detention of the person infected 
is the last resort in order to prevent the 
spreading of the disease, because less 
severe measures have been considered 
and found to be insufficient to safeguard 
the public interest. When these criteria 
are no longer fulfilled, the basis for the 
deprivation of liberty ceases to exist.9
This articulation of ‘lawfulness’ should be 
the key criterion in the entire process of 
awarding immunity passports: whether 
the deprivation of liberty is the only way 
to safeguard public interest.
A relevant question is who should deter-
mine public interest, which becomes the 
heart of the matter. Normally, the entity 
who wants to deprive a right (eg, the health 
authority) should provide evidence; in this 
situation, evidence that only curtailing 
the right to freedom of movement can 
prevent the spread of the disease. What 
is extraordinary about COVID-19 is that 
it has allowed governments to establish a 
presumption of hazard for entire popu-
lations. This hazard, governments claim, 
can primarily be neutralised through 
lockdowns.10
Can this presumption be maintained in 
the future? This is where the emergence 
of vaccines as game- changers comes into 
play: as soon as new vaccines are approved 
and begin to be administered, there will 
be a profound discussion about whether 
vaccines will guarantee greater rights and 
freedoms to those who are vaccinated 
than to others. This may not be the case. If 
not, vaccine certificates would not serve as 
immunity passports. One could maintain 
the idea that those vaccinated would be 
people working in vital sectors (eg, health-
care, food supply chain workers, trans-
porters, police and social workers) and 
people especially vulnerable to COVID-
19. A plausible justification would be to 
stop the chains of contagion in the former 
and not expose the latter to serious health 
risks, without conferring them a privi-
leged immunity status. Yet, this position 
would be hard to maintain both for scien-
tific reasons—it is difficult to sustain the 
hypothesis that vaccines do not confer 
immunity—and for practical reasons—it 
will not be easy to keep vaccinated groups 
confined due to public health reasons such 
as the peril of spreading COVID-19.
Our hypothesis, by contrast, is that 
society will be quick to consider that those 
who receive the vaccines are immune to 
COVID-19. Therefore, vaccinated people 
will reject being deprived of their basic 
rights and freedoms. Ultimately, this effect 
of dividing society into two large groups, 
the seropositive and the seronegative, 
will be unavoidable, even if we do not 
issue immunity passports to those who 
have recovered from COVID-19 without 
receiving the vaccine.
Another question to consider is why, 
in the case of vaccine certificates, this 
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scenario does not create for us the same 
perplexity as other types of acquisition 
of immunity against COVID-19—either 
immunity acquired by contagion or by 
individuals who have not been exposed 
to SARS- CoV-2 but who possess efficient 
T- lymphocytes leading to cross- immunity. 
In principle, one might think that there 
are notable differences in that the vaccine 
creates a different form of immunity. This, 
however, is not sound. In the short term, 
we will not know exactly what the effects 
of the vaccine are and whether they are 
the same for every recipient. In this regard, 
we will maintain a similar degree of uncer-
tainty between one method of acquiring 
immunity (ie, vaccines) and another (ie, 
antibodies following recovery). Moreover, 
if we accept that the vaccine produces 
some form of immunity, it will be because 
we have been able to establish some test 
that will allow us to certify that immunity. 
If such a test exists, it would be logical 
to respect the right to freedom of move-
ment for all persons who satisfy that test, 
regardless of how they have acquired that 
immunity.
Obviously, administering this test to 
everyone would be expensive and unnec-
essary in the case of those who have been 
vaccinated, because we should assume 
the overall success of the immunisation 
process. Evidence of immunity for those 
infected or for others who might try to 
claim immunity would instead be neces-
sary, which would still involve a cost. A 
health system may not be able to assume 
the total amount of massive antibody tests. 
This reasoning, however, is somewhat 
misleading. To begin with, it is problematic 
to take tests into account if the affected 
person covers the cost of the test; Brown et 
al note that ‘[a]ccess to testing should not, 
therefore, rely on personal wealth’. Still, 
this concern does not preclude the crucial 
question: if a person is able to show clin-
ical evidence that she meets the standard 
immunity requirements, on what grounds 
could she be denied further enjoyment of 
her right to freedom of movement?
There are only two good reasons to 
counter this freedom. The first is that it 
would create unfair discrimination to not 
allow all those who have potentially been 
infected or naturally immune to be tested. 
This is a problem of distributive justice, 
which must not be solved by depriving 
some people of the possibility of regaining 
their fundamental rights—that is, avoiding 
a levelling down move.2 The second is that, 
unlike vaccines, the acquisition of immu-
nity by contagion does not require finan-
cial capabilities. This would encourage 
the pernicious effect of people voluntarily 
exposing themselves to become infected in 
order to regain their fundamental rights. 
But again, these deleterious possibilities 
are not a reason to maintain unjust forced 
confinement on those who do not pose 
a threat to public health; rather, it is a 
reason to mitigate free- riding and reduce 
the incentives for contagion.
In light of these reflections, we must 
conclude that, in fact, it will be necessary 
to differentiate (even if it seems discrimi-
natory) between people who are immune 
and not immune to COVID-19 for public 
health reasons. Moreover, there are not 
legal reasons to discriminate those who 
cannot spread the disease. The basic issue 
will always be the same: if she is immune, 
there is no legal basis to curtail her funda-
mental rights, especially the right to 
freedom of movement. If not, there would 
be reasons for that curtailment. So there 
will indeed be two different types of citi-
zens. Hopefully, this division will be short- 
lived and a vaccine will become available 
to large masses of people within an accept-
able timeframe (say, for instance, 1 year). 
However, a further pressing problem may 
arise: those who do not want to be vacci-
nated will probably form a separate and 
perhaps discriminated- against population 
group. Another heated discussion will 
emerge about how to deal with this chal-
lenging issue. Unfortunately, we do not 
have space to address this debate here.
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